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ABSTRACT
The results from ten cyber security vulnerability assessments of process control, SCADA and 
energy management systems, or components of those systems were reviewed to identify common 
problem areas. The common vulnerabilities ranged from conventional IT security issues to 
specific weaknesses in control system protocols. 
In each vulnerability category, relative measures were assigned to the severity of the vulnerability 
and ease with which an attacker could exploit the vulnerability. Suggested mitigations are 
identified in each category. Recommended mitigations having the highest impact on reducing 
vulnerability are listed for asset owners and system vendors. 
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ACRONYMS
ARP  Address Resolution Protocol 
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IP  Internet Protocol 
IPS  Intrusion Prevention System 
IT  Information Technology 
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NSTB  National SCADA Test Bed 
OS  Operating System 
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM CYBER SECURITY ASSESSMENTS 
OF SCADA AND ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
1. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) established the National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) 
Program to help industry and government improve the security of the control systems used in the 
nation’s critical energy infrastructures.  The NSTB Program is funded and directed by the DOE 
Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE).  A key part of the program is 
the assessment of digital control systems to identify vulnerabilities that could put the systems at 
risk for a cyber attack.
This report summarizes the findings from cyber security assessments performed by Idaho 
National Laboratory (INL) as part of the NSTB Program.  Findings are also included from INL 
assessments performed for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Control 
System Security Program, managed by INL for the DHS National Cyber Security Division. 
The systems that were assessed ranged in complexity from a perimeter protection device, to small 
digital control systems, to large Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition/Energy Management 
Systems (SCADA/EMS) with complex networks, multiple servers and millions of lines of code.  
Assessments were performed in the INL SCADA Test Bed, in an INL process control systems 
test bed, and in operational installations (examining non-production or off-line systems). 
SCADA/EMS were of the greatest interest in the assessments because of their usual 
interconnections to critical infrastructure control equipment ranging from valves in oil and gas 
pipelines to switches and breakers in the national electric grid.  If compromised, these systems 
provide a path to many critical end devices and to other SCADA/EMS 
This report includes information from ten assessments performed within the DOE and DHS 
programs in the time period from late 2004 through early 2006.  These assessments were 
performed under Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) between the 
system vendors or asset owners and the INL. The vendors and owners provided software, 
hardware, training, and technical support.  The INL performed the cyber assessments and 
reported the results, including recommendations on ways to mitigate the vulnerabilities found. As 
noted above, some of these assessments were conducted at INL, others at asset owners’ sites. 
Under the terms of the CRADAs and associated nondisclosure agreements, proprietary 
information is withheld from public disclosure.  Results are therefore presented in a generic 
fashion in order to protect proprietary information, but every effort has been made to be specific 
enough to benefit those who provide, use, and secure the systems controlling our nation’s critical 
infrastructure. The report focuses on vulnerabilities that were observed across multiple 
assessments.  A fundamental criterion for including a vulnerability or recommendation in this 
report was that it is identified in at least two independent assessments.  The results summarized in 
this report describe vulnerabilities that were found to be common in field installations, spanning 
different control system vendor and asset owner configurations. Asset owners can use these 
observations, and the corresponding recommendations for mitigation, as a basis for enhancing the 
security of their control systems.  Control system vendors, system integrators, and third-party 
vendors can use the lessons learned to enhance the security characteristics of current and future 
products.
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The report is divided into sections describing the assessment methodologies, a detailed 
presentation of the assessment results and analysis, and recommendations for vendors and asset 
owners.
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2. ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES 
The configuration of the tested systems varied considerably depending on the vendor’s 
equipment, where the assessment was conducted (laboratory or in the field), and the specific 
objectives of the assessment. In all cases, the architecture and boundaries for the system under 
test were carefully determined. Standardized self-assessment tools were not used; targets of 
evaluation were developed individually for each assessment.  
2.1 Field Assessments   
Field assessments were conducted on several systems that had been previously assessed in-house 
at the INL. The field assessment methodology for these systems focused on the security defenses 
configured.  Reviewing of code, vulnerability scanning, and manipulation of end devices were not 
part of the field assessments due to the likely impact on operations. Some network scanning was 
done on non-production systems if available and the asset owner verified no impact to operations.  
The limited amount of time available for a field assessment constrained the scope of the 
assessment.  These assessments were tightly coordinated with the owner of the systems due to 
sensitivities on affecting the operational environment.  All of these assessments were done on 
non-production configurations. 
2.2 Process Control Systems and Component Assessments 
The assessment of process control systems and components focused on the architecture and 
communication paths of the system.  These systems were normally loaded on one or a limited 
number of PCs.  These in-house laboratory assessments allowed for more scrutiny since the 
concern for impact on a production operation system was absent.  The use of vulnerability 
scanners, code reviews, and manipulation of data to affect end devices were possible in these 
assessments.  The targets of evaluation were developed and modified based on the testing results.  
This flexibility was available because the system was in the laboratory and not competing for 
production resources.
2.3 SCADA and SCADA/EMS Assessments 
Assessments of several larger SCADA and SCADA/EMS systems were performed in-house at 
the INL SCADA Test Bed.  These systems reside on multiple servers but could be pared down to 
a single server installation in some cases.  These systems generally involve a greater degree of 
connectivity to other systems or applications than the process control systems.  Targets of 
evaluation were developed and modified based on the previous results.  The SCADA, EMS, and 
process control systems were configured based on the manufacturers’ recommendations.  These 
assessments were coordinated with the vendor, with plans and results shared. 
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3. AGGREGATION OF ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
The final reports from ten assessments were reviewed to identify common areas of vulnerabilities, 
characterize the relative risk associated with these vulnerabilities, and determine appropriate 
mitigation strategies. Only those vulnerabilities that were specifically identified in the formal 
reports were included; this excluded vulnerabilities whose existence was suggested only through 
informal discussions with the principal investigators. Reported vulnerabilities are included in this 
summary regardless of whether or not they were actually exploited during the assessment. All 
specific data from these assessments are controlled by the owner of the configuration or the 
vendor.  The results are only presented if at least two dissimilar configurations demonstrated the 
same vulnerability. 
3.1 Categorization of Vulnerabilities 
We note that currently there is not a commonly-accepted taxonomy for vulnerabilities. For the 
purposes of this aggregated review, vulnerabilities identified during the assessments were 
grouped into categories. The categories were defined based on the technical characteristics of the 
vulnerabilities observed. These categories are described in Table 1.
Table 1. Characteristic categories for vulnerabilities 
Category Description
Clear Text Communications Clear text (unencrypted) communications were observed in 
network traffic (through packet sniffing). The clear text 
revealed user names and passwords which might permit replay 
attacks or simplify the process of reverse engineering of the 
data protocol. In some cases, clear text communications were 
observed between the control system network and the external 
corporate network segments. 
Account Management Privileged accounts were found with default or easily guessed 
user names and passwords; hard-coded usernames and 
passwords were defined in documentation or extracted from 
binary executables or configuration files; password protection 
policies were weak. 
Weak  or No Authentication Little or no authentication of host-to-host communications, 
increasing the vulnerability of the system to impersonation, 
replay, or man-in-the-middle attacks 
Coding Practices Disassembly or decompilation of executable code revealed 
potentially unsafe coding styles (particularly with respect to 
string handling and buffer management); applications 
vulnerable to crashing on deliberately malicious input 
Unused Services Services with known vulnerabilities were running on hosts; 
need for the service was not apparent in the system architecture 
Network Addressing Network address resolution protocols (DNS, ARP, etc.) were 
exploitable by spoofing or other bypassing schemes. 
Scripting and Interface Batch files and other script files (Perl, etc.) could be exploited 
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Programming with malicious input or other techniques. 
Unpatched Components Software modules were not current versions, and contained 
known exploitable vulnerabilities that were required by the 
configuration. 
Web Servers and Clients Web servers were not securely configured, allowing directory 
traversal or file modification. 
Perimeter Protection Connections initiated from outside the SCADA perimeter; 
firewalls had unnecessary open ports; access control lists were 
misconfigured.
Enumeration Web servers and other network services revealed version 
information that could be of use to an attacker. 
These categories were further subdivided by the types of vulnerabilities observed. The 
vulnerability classes were defined only when at least two assessments from widely varying 
configurations exhibited the deficiencies in that class. This was intended to eliminate 
vulnerability classes that were unique to only one assessment, and to ensure the classes 
encompassed common deficiencies across multiple assessments. 
3.2 Identification of Recommended Mitigations 
After the reported vulnerabilities were categorized as described above, a set of corresponding 
recommendations for mitigation was developed. The recommended mitigations were developed 
based on those recommended in the assessment reports, and from reviews by computer security 
experts. The recommended mitigations tend to be general in nature, with the intent of being 
applicable to vulnerabilities identified in multiple assessments. As such, they are generic 
recommendations and require further refinement before implementation on any specific system.  
A majority of the recommendations will require vendor development, not just a configuration 
change that can be done by the end users.  Based on typical maintenance agreements, changes 
may have to be approved by the maintenance provider prior to implementation.  All changes will 
have to be tested to determine the impact to production and operations.  Some mitigations would 
require extensive rewrites and are not feasible for application to current software releases. In 
these cases other defensive measures are needed. 
3.3 Rating of Vulnerabilities 
To characterize the risk associated with the identified vulnerabilities, two measures were 
established:
x Ease of Attack 
x Severity of Impact 
A subjective scale (High, Medium, or Low) was used for each of these. The scales are designed 
such that a “High” rating corresponds to a greater threat to system security. The rating of 
vulnerabilities was conducted by the authors in consultation with the computer security and 
control system experts that conducted the original assessments. 
3.3.1 Ease of Attack 
This measure is a subjective evaluation of how easily the vulnerability could be exploited by an 
attacker. This evaluation considered the relative degree of technical skill that an attacker would 
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need, what extent of system-specific knowledge would be required, and how much time would be 
needed to exploit the vulnerability. The likelihood of attack detection is not considered in this 
measure.  
Table 2. Measures for Ease of Attack 
Rating Criteria
NONE
(green)
x [not considered exploitable] 
x An exploit was attempted but did not succeed 
LOW
(yellow) 
x Exploitable only by a highly-skilled attacker 
x Would require days or weeks to exploit 
x Knowledge of the control system is necessary 
MEDIUM
(orange)
x Would require a day or less to exploit, or would require the use of 
multiple scripts or techniques to accomplish the exploit 
HIGH
(red)
x Exploit tools are available to unskilled attackers  
x Exploit can be accomplished in less than an hour 
It is assumed that an attacker has already gained access to an appropriate point in the system to 
conduct the exploit. This measure does not address the difficulty an attacker might face in 
reaching the point where the vulnerability could be exploited, but instead how easily can an 
attacker proceed from that point. That is, this measure assumes that the attacker is inside the 
security perimeter of the system. 
The Ease of Attack is characterized twice, once for the “As Found” condition during the 
assessment, and again for the “After” case assuming that the recommended mitigations are 
implemented. 
3.3.2 Severity of Impact 
This measure is a subjective evaluation of the extent to which system operability could be 
impacted  by a successful exploit. As with the “Ease of Attack” measure, it is assumed that the 
attacker has already gained access to the appropriate point in the system in order to conduct the 
exploit. To state this in different terms, this measure attempts to characterize the incremental loss 
of system security resulting from the exploit. 
Table 3. Measures for Severity of Impact 
Rating Criteria
NONE
(green)
x no impact 
LOW
(yellow) 
x attacker can gain additional information that is not directly exploitable 
(e.g., usernames without passwords, application version numbers, etc.) 
MEDIUM
(orange)
x attacker can degrade system performance  
HIGH
(red)
x attacker can act as a legitimate control system user 
x attacker can gain administrative rights (“root” privileges) 
x attacker can evade detection, conduct man-in-the-middle attacks to spoof 
operator displays 
INL/CON-06-11665  10 
DRAFT 1 August 2006 
INL/CON-06-11665  11 
3.4 Frequency of Occurrence 
As described elsewhere in this document, each assessment had different goals. Not every 
assessment examined all of the vulnerability areas defined in the matrices. The summary data 
tables (Table 4) include a description of how many of the assessments included a particular area 
in the assessment.  For example, an entry of “3/5” indicates that only five of the assessments 
considered that vulnerability area, and three of the assessments actually exhibited relevant 
vulnerabilities. 
3.5 Summary of Assessment Results 
Table 4 is a summary of the relative ease of attack in the different vulnerability categories, both 
before and after recommendations for mitigation are implemented. Some recommendations 
require substantial vendor involvement and cannot be implemented simply with a configuration 
change.  Recommended vendor involvement is noted in the comments section. This table is an 
aggregation of the results from individual assessments. In some vulnerability classes, the ease of 
attack varied across individual assessments; this is indicated by multiple columns. Given the 
range of goals in individual assessments, and the details of specific vulnerabilities, the table 
reflects some unavoidable mixing of dissimilar elements. However, the vulnerabilities identified 
and the recommended mitigation approaches do tend to be applicable across the range of systems. 
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Table 4 include suggested mitigation strategies in each vulnerability category. Some of these 
actions can be implemented in the field by asset owners; other mitigations involve design changes 
that must originate with vendors and system integrators. This section identifies high priority 
recommendations for each of those groups.  
The recommendations address vulnerabilities with high or moderate severity that can be 
eliminated or made much more difficult to attack successfully. Due to the unique characteristics 
inherent in every system, it will not be possible to apply every recommended mitigation in any 
particular system design or deployment. However, a defense-in-depth strategy should be used to 
avoid over-reliance on any one particular security measure. 
4.1 Recommendations for Asset Owners 
These recommendations primarily apply to the in-the-field configuration. As one might expect, 
they reflect common practices in conventional IT security. Effective implementation of some of 
these recommendations will require cooperation from vendors and system integrators. 
Action #1: Implement effective patch management policies to ensure that operating 
systems and installed applications are kept as up-to-date as possible with 
released patches.  
Benefit: Reduces the exposed attack surface associated with known vulnerabilities.  
Patches are frequently released in response to publicly identified 
vulnerabilities.   
Considerations: Close coordination with control system vendors is needed to ensure 
compatibility of operating system and security patches with control system 
servers and workstations. Negotiate a flaw remediation with the vendor and the 
expected time from discovery to correction.  Coordinate with the vendor to 
identify defense in depth strategies to protect the system prior to implementing 
the patch or upgrade. 
Action #2: Remove or disable unnecessary services on control system servers and 
workstations. Only those services required for control system operation should 
be enabled. 
Benefit: Eliminates the readily exploitable code associated with such services.   
Considerations: Verify list of required services with control system vendor. During factory 
acceptance testing and site acceptance testing, vulnerability scans can be 
conducted on these non-production configurations. The results will identify 
known vulnerabilities in components and the patching levels needed.  This 
output can also be used to identify all applications on the system and aids in the 
elimination of unneeded components. This activity can also be done on non-
production configurations if not in a procurement activity. 
Action #3: Adopt account management policies reflecting conventional IT best practices. 
Replace default usernames whenever possible. Establish password policies 
ensuring appropriate password complexity and prohibiting short or easily  
guessed passwords. 
Benefit: Reduces or eliminates the vulnerabilities ranging from default accounts to weak 
passwords that provide opportunities for an intruder to gain entry into the 
system.    
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Considerations: Coordinate with control system vendor on any default usernames. Identify 
session weakness such as cookies or remembered account names between 
sessions and coordinate with the vendor for resolution.  Coordinate with in-
house IT department for account, password and user activity logging to identify 
areas where resources and policies can be joined. 
Action #4: Isolate the control system perimeter from the corporate network by an 
appropriate combination of firewalls and DMZs. Configure firewalls to block 
inbound connections, and limit outbound connections to only those specifically 
required for operations. Only allow specifically necessary network protocols in 
the DMZ; block or filter unnecessary protocols. Eliminate network connections 
that bypass perimeter protection. 
Benefit: Eliminates weaknesses  in control system perimeter protection  and increases 
the difficulty for an external attacker to exploit other vulnerabilities Because of 
its public visibility and accessibility, the corporate network is vulnerable to 
intrusion through the use of publicly available hacking tools.  Without the 
added protection of a DMZ or carefully configured firewalls, disruption of the 
control network is possible by relatively unskilled attackers. 
Considerations: Work with vendor or system integrator to identify all traffic between control 
system or SCADA and the DMZ.  Identify the originator of the communication 
and the sequence of re-establishing communications upon failure.   This 
information is critical in designing a DMZ. Coordinate with in-house IT 
departments for relevant expertise to identify areas where resources and 
policies can be joined. 
Action #5: Implement security hardening of web servers located within the control system 
network (or having access to the control system network) to establish least 
access permissions. 
Benefit: Eliminates directory traversal attacks and other common vulnerabilities.   
Considerations: (none identified) 
Asset owners may also wish to determine if vulnerability assessments have been conducted on 
systems similar to their own; this information would be available through the respective system 
vendors. If assessments have been conducted, the results should be reviewed to identify any 
system-specific vulnerabilities that merit additional field mitigations. For new procurements, 
asset owners should consider the recommendations for system vendors during the specification 
and bid evaluation process. 
4.2 Recommendations for System Vendors 
Vendors who have conducted assessments on their own systems will already be familiar with the 
detailed findings for their system. The following recommendations primarily apply to system 
design, rather than field deployment issues. 
Action #1: Establish patch management and review processes to verify compatibility of 
patches for operating systems and required third-party applications. 
Benefit: Reduces the exposed attack surface by eliminating known vulnerabilities that 
are often published in the open.   
Considerations: (none identified) 
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Action #2: Modify protocols to eliminate clear text network transmission of usernames and 
passwords. As a minimum, passwords should be transmitted only in a suitable 
hashed or encrypted format. 
Benefit: Eliminates an attacker’s ability to easily obtain this information and then use it 
to gain access to the control  
Considerations: (See section below regarding Encrypted Protocols) 
Action #3: Modify protocols to include support for authentication of connections between 
sender and receiver. 
Benefit: Eliminates the vulnerabilities associated with impersonation, replay, and man-
in-the-middle attacks  
Considerations: May require action by industry standards organizations 
Action #4: Adopt appropriate software development life cycle practices to eliminate 
common coding errors that affect security, particularly with respect to input 
data validation and buffer management. 
Benefit: Eliminates many common sources of security vulnerabilities that allow 
uploading of malicious code onto control system servers  
Considerations: Also applies to system integrators who perform software development for 
turnkey installations. For legacy software, code reviews can be done to identify 
the most common security vulnerabilities.  Protection of the source code on the 
installation facility is needed to prevent malicious actors from identifying 
vulnerabilities once inside an installation.  Searching the installed configuration 
for known accounts and passwords to eliminate those hardcoded values is also 
recommended. 
Action #5: Adopt a role based security model, limiting user privileges to only those needed 
for specific tasks. 
Benefit: Limits the potential damage an attacker could accomplish after exploiting the 
vulnerabilities. 
Considerations: (none identified) 
4.3 Discussion of Selected Protective Measures 
4.3.1 Considerations for Encrypted Networks 
In several of the vulnerability categories, “encryption, where feasible” is recommended as a 
mitigation. The benefit of an encrypted data protocol is that it becomes substantially more 
difficult for an attacker to obtain usernames and passwords, reverse engineer the protocol, or 
insert malicious data streams. However, encryption of the control system data protocol can 
present performance issues, and increases the complexity of the system development and 
maintenance processes. Furthermore, encrypted data traffic becomes essentially opaque to 
network monitoring and intrusion detection systems. Although encryption can eliminate some 
vulnerabilities, the associated disadvantages are such that it will be suitable only after careful 
evaluation of operational constraints and network monitoring policies. 
4.3.2 Detection and Monitoring Tools 
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Malware Detection. Antivirus, spyware and bot detectors are typically not used within the control 
system perimeter. The download of the signature-based virus scanners or the process of 
performing a scan may have the effect of a denial of service on most control system networks.  
Some vendors supply tested virus protection mechanisms with their systems; others require 
extensive testing prior to installing on the inner network. These capabilities are typically 
established at the control system perimeter as a minimum.  
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems   Anomaly based intrusion detection systems (IDS) , 
which report deviations from a known traffic baseline, are suitable for control system network 
environments where a flood of traffic is not expected (such as exception reporting from end 
devices during bad weather) or if tuned for those incidents.  The signature based IDS typically 
work on TCP/IP only and are not tuned for proprietary protocols found in control system 
networks. However, some work is being done in industry on vendor-independent IDS rules for 
common protocols, and some control system vendors are now providing guidelines for IDS 
monitoring. 
Host based IDS (HIDS) can be used to detect new files on a host computer, system administrative 
access, and the escalation of privileges. Point data files (the status of the endpoints) change 
frequently and could lead to creation of very large log files, unless these data files are excluded 
from HIDS coverage.  Another type of host-based IDS is a “canary” type of honeypot.  This is a 
host that performs no function for the process control operations, and no other devices on a static 
addressed inner network would communicate with this host.  If some process tries to 
communicate with the host, it alarms. This poison box can be used to detect attempts to 
enumerate the network. 
Intrusion prevention systems (IPS) are less common on control systems.  If the IPS is not 
carefully tuned for proprietary control system protocols, the active response may shutdown 
communications.  For example, some configurations with many end devices use a Fieldbus 
architecture with the end devices only reporting on exception.  During the restoration of end 
devices (e.g. after a storm), these end devices report their status back to the SCADA network.   A 
User Data Gram (UDP) type of protocol is common in these architectures.  The flood of these 
packets can be misinterpreted as a denial of service attack on the network, and an IPS not tuned to 
the network will shutdown these connections during the critical stages of restoration.  
All of these activities produce logs and are of little use unless the logs are reviewed on a regular 
basis.  These logs aid in identifying what happened in an incident.  The network dumps can also 
be used to verify what is being transmitted through the firewalls and what the normal network 
traffic looks like. This aids in tuning the firewalls and IDSs. The system logs allow the user to 
figure out the host activities.  These logs can be reviewed together to determine the order of 
events.
4.4 General Recommendation – A Proactive Security Model 
All the above recommendations can be used individually to improve the security configuration of 
the system on a piecemeal basis.  However, this is a reactive approach that does not necessarily 
keep the overall security picture in mind.  Current common practices in computer security 
recommend  a proactive security model such as shown in Figure 1; the following description is 
adapted from Reference 1. 
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Figure 1.  Proactive security model 
x The first step is to map out the architecture and understand what components are in place 
and what their communication paths are.  This step would have reduced the findings in 
the perimeter protection categories, where additional communications paths were 
identified.
x The next step is to perform a risk assessment.  Understanding the impacts to the 
vulnerabilities and the threats is critical to focus resources on the assets where the threat 
or vulnerability has high impact.   
x Understanding where the assets are located is required to ensure the physical protection 
of the assets.   
x Creating a protection profile will aid in the understanding of what type of protection is 
needed for each critical asset. This will aid in the prioritization and allocation of 
resources.
x The identification and removal of vulnerabilities would eliminate the known 
vulnerabilities found in unpatched components and unused services.   
x Creating a standardized policy ensures the efforts to harden the operating system or 
segment the network are not undone by poor configuration management practices.   
x Retention of log files and procedures to respond to incidents is needed for recovery.  
Monitoring of the network logs would have detected the replay or man-in-the-middle 
type of vulnerabilities.   
x Training of the users will aid in the policies being followed and what to do in case of a 
suspected cyber attack.   
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As the diagram suggests, a proactive security model is an ongoing process rather than a one-time 
activity. The typical lifespan of these systems, ten to fifteen years, further highlights the need for 
an ongoing security process. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Spanning different control system vendor and asset owner configurations, the results summarized 
in this report describe vulnerabilities that were found to be common in field installations. Asset 
owners can use these observations, and the corresponding recommendations for mitigation, as a 
basis for enhancing the security of their control systems.  Control system vendors, system 
integrators, and third-party vendors can use the lessons learned to enhance the security 
characteristics of current and future products. 
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